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Is Free Trade “Free?” Is It Even “Trade?” 
Oppression and Consent in Hemispheric Trade Agreements*
 
Prof. Frank J. Garcia1
Boston College Law School 
 
Abstract 
 
 In order for free trade as a policy to deliver fully on its social 
promise, it must be both “free” and “trade.”  In fact, it must be free, in the 
sense of voluntary, to be trade at all.  In other words, for normative and 
practical reasons, free trade requires that global economic relations be 
structured through agreements which reflect the consent of those subject to 
them.  The neoliberal trading system today only imperfectly lives up to 
this obligation.  In this essay, I will examine the role of consent in trade 
agreements, drawing on examples from CAFTA as representative of 
important trends in multilateral and hemispheric integration systems.  I 
will argue that an investigation into the nature of trade as a human 
experience reveals that many aspects of current trade law and policy mix 
what is ostensibly free trade with something else: exploitation, coercion or 
predation.  This has normative implications for the justification of the 
neoliberal trading system, and practical implications for the analysis and 
structure of trade agreements and the stability and security of our foreign 
relations. 
 
 
“…where there is voluntary agreement, there…is justice.” 
Plato, Symposium (Jowett) 
 
“The United States seems destined by Providence to plague  
Latin America with misery in the name of liberty.”   
Simon Bolivar 
 
I Introduction 
 The phrase “free trade” invokes the idea of freedom in two ways.  The 
conventional meaning of the phrase is that trade is free if it is not subject to distorting 
governmental regulation.  The second, less obvious meaning is that free trade involves 
                                                 
*Originally delivered at the symposium Free Market Fundamentalism: A Critical Review of Dogmas and 
Consequences, sponsored by the South-North Exchange on Theory, Culture and Law and held in Bogota, 
Colombia in May 2006. Forthcoming in Seattle Journal for Social Justice, volume 5, issue 2 (2007). 
1 I am indebted to Kim Garcia, Kevin Kennedy, Sonia Roland, Hillel Steiner and Diane Suhm, and to my 
colleagues at the 2006 South-North Exchange Conference on Hemispheric Integration, for their helpful 
comments.  All mistakes remain my own.  Thanks also to Daniel Blanchard for his very able assistance and 
to Benjamin Weiner, and to the Boston College Law School Fund and the Fr. Francis J. Nicholson S.J. 
Fund for their support.   
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consensual exchange – it has the consent of those involved in the trade.  This is true at the 
level of private exchange, and at the institutional level, involving the structure and 
negotiation of the agreements framing trade relations.   
 In this essay, I will argue that for free trade to be both free and trade, it must be 
free in the second sense as well: it must be consensual.  Trade must involve the consent 
of both the participants and the states involved.  Otherwise, it is not trade in the fullest 
sense, but partakes of some form of oppression: predation, exploitation, or coercion. 
 In this essay I will focus on the public level of trade, involving trade as a set of 
economic relations and as a system for governing such relations, rather than on the 
private level of individual transactions, although I will draw illustrations from private 
exchange.  Through an examination of CAFTA’s negotiation process and select 
substantive provisions, I hope to tease out elements of trade agreements which represent 
dynamics other than trade – predation, exploitation or coercion.  Such an argument 
cannot hope to be definitive, but I hope it is suggestive – reliably so – of subtle but 
important forces at work in contemporary trade relations, particularly as they involve 
substantial inequalities in power among participating states. 
 
II Investigation of Trade as a Human Experience 
 Both our language and our collective experience of trade suggest many possible 
aspects or dimensions of the experience that merit further inquiry as we try to understand 
just what trade is. 
 A. Sampling the Many Dimensions of Trade 
  1. Trade as Exchange 
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 To begin with, we can see trade as involving transactions.  When we trade, we 
engage in a transaction – something changes hands, so to speak.  I exchange this with 
you, for that which you have that I want.  In this sense, trade is a basic everyday 
experience among people.2
 We also speak of trade in a specifically international sense, as exchanges 
involving the crossing of geographic and political boundaries.  This evokes other 
dimensions, such as trade as exploration, where economic need rouses us out of the 
known into the unknown; and trade as adventure: will this gamble pay off?  Will the 
merchant ships arrive? Will my fortune grow or be lost?3
  2. Trade as Encounter    
 The desire to exchange brings us into contact with another; historically as we 
cross boundaries to trade, it has meant encounter with the Other.4 Thus trade is one of the 
prime forces bringing peoples in contact with other peoples, on terms which might result 
in a mutually beneficial exchange.  In this way, trade is a primal form of communication: 
this is who we are, what we make, what we want and how we exchange. 
 One of the marvelous aspects of trade is that it can involve communication and 
exchange with the Other where there is no shared language, culture or history – only the 
mutual desire to exchange.  In this way we can see that trade involves what Stanley 
                                                 
2 Amartya Sen puts it this way: “The freedom to exchange words, or goods, or gifts does not need defensive 
justification…; they are part of the way human beings in society live and interact with each other…” 
DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 6 (2000). 
3 For example, international trade and its vicissitudes (the loss of Antonio’s ships) is one of the dramatic 
forces propelling the primary story of The Merchant of Venice, which is also about another aspect of trade, 
namely which kinds of exchanges we will and will not allow.  WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF 
VENICE.  It has been suggested that this play shadows all our inquiries into trade, markets, and capitalism 
itself.  See Sebastiano Maffetone, “Is Capitalism Morally Acceptable?” (unpublished manuscript on file 
with the author).  
4 On the many ramifications of the Other, see EDWARD SAID, ORIENTALISM (1978). 
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Cavell calls “acknowledgement”- the recognition that the Other exists as a separate, 
recognizable human person, even if we cannot directly or fully know their mind.5
 Of course, encounters with the Other are not always beneficent.6 We can try to 
profit from the lack of shared language, or other information asymmetries, to engage in 
sharp dealing – trade as trickery or deceit.  We have many colloquial examples of this: 
offering to sell one another the Brooklyn Bridge, or the fable about Manhattan being 
“purchased” from indigenous Americans for a “handful of beads.”7  
  3. Trade as Domination   
 This raises another, more serious aspect of trade, trade as conquest.  Obviously, 
we cannot mean this literally: conquest is conquest.  However, if we consider the “trade” 
relations of the East India Company, for example, or the notorious “Unequal Treaties” 
between China and the West, we can see an aspect of trade as ‘domination’ under the 
guise of trading.8 Anthony Anghie chronicles the way in which trading companies were 
used to assert sovereignty and extend dominion of colonizing states over vast territories 
that European states were not yet ready to administer directly.9 Similarly, James Gaathi 
documents the role of free trade concepts in legitimating Belgium’s monopoly on 
                                                 
5 STANLEY CAVELL, THE CLAIM OF REASON 329-426 (1979). 
6 Returning to The Merchant of Venice, the proposed flesh trade in the play already shows several of the 
negative dynamics of trade to be examined in this essay: coercion, inequalities in social power, and the 
breakdown of acknowledgement along ethnic, religious and gender lines.  SHAKESPEARE, supra note 3.  
The most memorable speeches of the play are calls for acknowledgement.  I am indebted to Kim Garcia for 
pointing this out.   
7 See Peter Francis, Jr., Beads and Manhattan, http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/41/415.html, last 
visited January 2, 2007. 
8 See, e.g., ANTHONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW  
(CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS 2005); Omar Saleem, The Spratly Islands Dispute: China Defines the New 
Millennium, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 527, 554-6 (2000) (documenting commercial exploitation, lack of 
reciprocity and legacy of bitterness arising from unequal treaties); EDUARDO GALEANO, THE OPEN VEINS 
OF LATIN AMERICA 197 (1973 (“Latin America’s big ports, through which the wealth of its soil and subsoil 
passed en route to distant centers of power, were…built up as instruments of the conquest and domination 
of the countries to which they belonged, and as conduits through which to drain the nations’ income.”). 
9 Anghie, supra note 8, at 68. 
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exploitation of the Congo under the “freedom of commerce” principles agreed at the 
Berlin Conference.10 By arguing that trade should be free, the U.S. in effect left the stage 
open for unregulated exploitation of the Congo.11 This suggests how trade can function 
as a form of dominance over the Other.12
 B. Investigating Trade as a Transaction 
 I would now like to take a few of these aspects of trade that seem most essential, 
and explore them further in order to construct a preliminary picture of trade as a human 
experience.   
  1. Trade as an Exchange of Value 
 I will begin with the notion of trade as a transaction.  We engage in many types of 
transactions throughout our lives, involving money, sentiment, goods, ideas, services, 
affinity, information, etc.  But if we think of what distinguishes trade from the many 
other exchanges we experience, it is that trade involves a transfer of economic value. 
  2. Trade as a Bilateral Exchange of Value 
 There are many different types of transactions involving a transfer of value.  
Gifts, for example, are transactions involving a transfer of value, but one of their 
distinguishing characteristics is their unilateral nature: the gift giver transfers something 
                                                 
10 JAMES THUO GATHII, How American Support for Freedom of Commerce Legitimized King Leopold’s 
Territorial Ambitions in the Congo , in TRADE AS GUARANTOR OF PEACE, LIBERTY AND SECURITY? 
CRITICAL, HISTORICAL AND EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES 97, 97 (PADIDEH ALA’I ET AL. EDS., 2006). 
11 Id. 
12 Id. (citing SAID, supra note 4 at 3).  The secondary story in The Merchant of Venice is also about 
domination, about choosing a woman not as a commodity but as a person.  SHAKESPEARE, supra note 3.  
Shakespeare makes the point that there is no marriage if she is a commodity, just as there is no trade if it 
involves domination.  Id.  Viewed in this light, the play is also about the limits of the market place, as for 
example when Bassanio is given a ring he is not to give away.  See id.  Historically, we can read the play as 
responding to a contemporaneous wave of globalization and the European approach to the “New” World: 
can we deny our own and others’ humanity for economic gain, involving for example slavery, the mines 
and the encomienda system?  Does this new world mean it is all up for grabs, that maybe the old rules 
won’t apply in this new economic space?  These questions are never far from the surface in international 
trade.   
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of value for nothing in return.13 This helps us see that trade transactions are bilateral, or 
mutual, in nature.  They involve a bilateral exchange of economic value. 
  3. Trade as a Voluntary Bilateral Exchange for Value 
 There is another type of unilateral transaction helpful in clarifying the nature of 
trade: theft.  A theft involves a transfer of value, but it is not voluntary.  It could be said 
that theft is not trade because it is unilateral, but it is easy to see that this is not the 
essence of the distinction; the thief could give you a cheap watch in return for your 
wallet, and it would still be a theft despite its bilateral quality.  Thus trade must also be 
voluntary – both parties must consent to the transaction, or there is some element of theft.   
 This also fits our intuitions as reflected in our language.  We can speak of good 
trades versus bad trades in terms of meeting our goals, and yet we also distinguish even 
bad trades from “rip-offs” or thefts.  We would not refer to the experience of being 
robbed as a “bad trade,” except in a deliberately ironic sense.  Thus trade involves 
bilateral voluntary exchanges. 
  4. Trade as a Voluntary Negotiated Exchange for Value 
 There is a further particular aspect to this voluntariness, which we can express in 
the notion of bargain.  Bargaining, or the process of reaching mutually agreeable terms, is 
a necessary element of reaching consent, and presumes the freedom of both parties to 
consider and propose a variety of possibilities on the road to saying yes, or no.  Where 
either of the parties is not able to bargain freely, the resulting transaction may still be 
                                                 
13 One could characterize a gift as a mutual exchange if one considers the subjective moral or emotional 
good which the gift giver experiences “in return,  or if there is an implicit expectation that one gift will lead 
to a reciprocal one.  However, I think the unilateral analysis is closer to the essence of our concept of “gift” 
and clearer for our purposes.   
 6
voluntary in a basic sense, but something has been lost.  This is more like coercion than 
trade, and I will say more about this in a moment.   
 This notion of bargained-for consent is reflected in our law through the concept  
of a meeting of minds.  The “meeting of minds” in contract law, even as a constructive 
notion, is key to the whole doctrinal armature for enforcing promises.  For example, if we 
look at many of the key justifications for getting out of a contract – mistake, duress, fraud 
– we can see that they reflect the absence of a meeting of minds, an absence of bargained-
for consent.   
 This brings us back to the aspect of trade as acknowledgement: the act of reaching 
a bargain presupposes the existence of another mind, similar enough in its basic functions 
(consulting self-interest, evaluating, judging, bargaining) to be recognizably human – 
“like me.”14 The reaching of a bargain can be a moment of affirmation of the Other’s 
humanity, of similarity to self.  In fact, acknowledgement is a presupposition of consent, 
and therefore of trade, in that we have to acknowledge the Other’s humanity before we 
can value the Others’ consent.15
 To summarize, trade can be understood as consisting of voluntary, bargained-for 
exchanges of value among persons for mutual economic benefit.   
 C. What is Not Trade, and Why 
 Based on this preliminary inquiry, I would like to look more closely at several 
alternatives to trade, i.e., other forms of economic interaction that are not trade, or at least 
not simply trade, in order to paint a fuller picture of what trade is, and what it is not.  In 
doing so, I will be relying primarily on the work of Simone Weil, the “philosopher of 
                                                 
14 In a similar sense, Joseph Vining writes that law presupposes the presence of human minds.  THE 
AUTHORITATIVE AND THE AUTHORITARIAN (UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS 1986). 
15 I am indebted to Kim Garcia for pointing this out. 
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oppression,”16 for her frank examination of the role of consent and its absence in 
distinguishing between economic transactions and economic oppression   
 1. Predation 
 In the discussion above on the nature of exchange, I introduced the concept of 
theft as a contrast to trade.  What is essential to this distinction is the absence of consent 
on the part of the one surrendering economic value.  Simone Weil writes that one cannot 
seek consent where there is no power of refusal.17 Thus where there is no power to 
refuse, there is no trade, because there can be no consent. 
 At the private party level, the law of contract recognizes this difference through 
the concept of duress as a defense to the finding of a contractual obligation.  In other 
words, where one party’s consent to enter into a contract was not freely given, but given 
under some form of pressure, the law will not recognize this as a meeting of minds and 
will not find a contract. 
 In economic terms, the equivalent to theft, or transactions which are not mutual 
and where consent is not in fact present, can be called extraction or predation; add a 
political element, and we call it economic dominance, colonialism, etc.  In these cases, an 
economic benefit is flowing from one party to the other, but it is not mutual in a 
meaningful sense, and most importantly it is not consensual.  It is achieved through 
inequalities in power as expressed in economic or military force.  Such transactions are 
                                                 
16 Adrienne Rich, For a Friend in Travail, in AN ATLAS OF THE DIFFICULT WORLD: POEMS 1988—1991 
(W.W. NORTON 1991) (“What are you going through? she said, is the great question. / Philosopher of 
oppression, theorist/ of the victories of force.” (‘she’ being Weil, who says on page 115 of WAITING FOR 
GOD: "The love of our neighbor in all its fullness simply means being able to say to him: "What are you 
going through?")) 
17 Justice and Human Society, in SIMONE WEIL 123 (ERIC O. SPRINGSTED ED.) (ORBIS 1998) (“Justice and 
Human Society”). 
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not consistent with our concept of trade as I have outlined it above: they are a form of 
wealth extraction, in the purest colonial sense. 
  2. Coercion 
 Short of extraction, we can recognize a more subtle weakening of consent, 
involving what I will call coercion.18 Coercion occurs when a transaction is mutual and in 
some basic way consensual, but something weakens the fullness or freedom of the 
consent, short of outright theft or duress.  This may still be a trade transaction in some 
meaningful sense, but something else is going on.  This usually involves restricting the 
range of possible bargains that the parties are free, or not free, to propose and consider. 
Thus coercion presupposes an inequality in bargaining power, which one party has 
exercised on the other party to limit the range of possibilities “on the table,” so to speak. 
 As with duress, contract law also reflects this distinction.  The law provides 
particular protections for consumers and others with weaker bargaining power when they 
deal in what contract law calls “adhesion contracts,” or contracts with commercial parties 
or manufacturers with greater bargaining power.  In such cases, where a dealer says “if 
you want this, these are the terms and the only terms” and consumers cannot negotiate, 
then courts will look more carefully before assuming consent by the consumer to adverse 
terms of the contract thus formed, despite the fact that in all other material respects it 
looks as if a contract was voluntarily entered into.  They will not automatically void a 
contract as would be the case with duress, but they will pay careful attention and they 
may not enforce all of its provisions. 
                                                 
18 This can also be called oppression.  Simone Weil writes that next to rape, “oppression is the second 
horror of human existence.  It is a terrible caricature of obedience.”  What renders it so is the absence of 
consent.  Justice and Human Society, supra note 17 at 122. 
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 Put into the terms of this essay, coercion can result in trade, in that there is 
mutuality of exchange and some form of consent, but not free trade, because one of the 
two parties was not fully free to bargain.19 The element of coercion introduces normative, 
substantive and practical considerations that will be discussed further below.  
  3. Exploitation 
 In some very interesting and suggestive recent work, Hillel Steiner extends his 
liberal theory of exploitation to consider international economic exchanges, contrasting 
free trade to exploitation.20 In addition to the requirements that trade be both a bilateral 
exchange and voluntary, he adds a third element, namely that the two transfers be of 
roughly equal value.21  Where two transfers are not of equal value, yet the exchange is 
voluntary, Steiner characterizes this as evidence of exploitation.   
 Exploitation can have many causes, but the classical illustration he offers is of a 
market for services in which the top bid, which the service provider accepts, does not 
reflect the maximum possible value of the services, but only the top bid in that market.  
Steiner does not rely, however, on any objective theory of value to characterize the bid as 
                                                 
19 Such trade may still perform some socially useful function in the traditional sense of “free” trade, insofar 
as the transactions follow the logic of comparative advantage and therefore lead to aggregate welfare 
increases.  However, if we believe in the free market as the best mechanism for deriving the full economic 
benefit from resources, then this sort of coerced trade will very likely result in the under-utilization of 
resources, since the parties are not free to bargain fully.  Therefore, there is a sound basis in economic 
rationality for promoting free trade in its fullest consensual form. 
20 Exploitation Among Nations (unpublished manuscript on file with author); see generally Hillel Steiner, A 
Liberal Theory of Exploitation, 94 ETHICS 225 (1983-4) (exploitation analyzed in terms of prior rights 
violations). 
21 By rough equality, I mean (and I take Steiner to mean) that both parties consider the exchange fair – 
there is an appropriate relation in their eyes between what they are giving and what they are receiving.  
This does not mean that the exchange is in any necessary sense between objects, etc. of equal or roughly 
equal value in the literal sense.  See DAVID MILLER, MARKET, STATE AND COMMUNITY 175 (1989) 
(exploitation consists of the use of special advantages to deflect markets away from equilibrium, defined as 
exchanges involving equivalent value). 
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inadequate.22  Instead, he suggests we look at other parties who might have bid, and bid 
more, but for various reasons did not. 
 Among the reasons they did not bid which amount to exploitation, we can look at 
the possibility that earlier rights violations mean that potential offerors lacked the capital 
to bid despite an interest in doing so, or the possibility that governmental interference on 
either side prevented them from participating in the auction.  In either case, the result for 
the service provider is that they accept a voluntary mutual exchange, but for less than 
they might otherwise have received, under circumstances we would consider exploitative. 
In other words, the transaction is both consensual and mutual, yet exploitative, for the 
reason that a potentially higher-paying third party was not able to enter the auction.23    
 Applied to trade, this suggests that where certain third party states and/or citizens 
are kept out of markets, or are economically unable to participate effectively in markets, 
to the detriment of an offeror, who receives only a lower bid from someone else, then the 
resulting trades between that offeror and the ultimate purchaser are not free trade but 
exploitation.  This differs from coercion, in that the force, pressure or rights violation 
occurs with respect to the third party, not between the two primary parties to the 
transaction.  Nevertheless, this affects our evaluation of the consensual nature of the 
resulting transaction, in that the offeror’s consent was granted among a restricted range of 
choices.  In contrast to coercion, however, the restriction was not a function of the 
relative power of the parties, but of the oppression of a third party.  Once again, as with 
                                                 
22 For this he has been criticized, though in my view unpersuasively.  See id. at 180. 
23 Accord id. at 177, 186 (it is in the nature of exploitation that exploited party is unable to consider 
alternative, more attractive hypothetical transactions due to exploiter’s use of unfair advantage).  Miller 
considers the rights-violation theory of exploitation too narrow, but for my purposes here it is enough to 
note that such a case would be exploitation, even if as Miller argues, other cases should also qualify.  Id. at 
181-2. 
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coercion, exploitation can result in trade, in that there is mutuality of exchange and some 
form of consent, but not free trade, since the parties were not free to consider all possible 
offers because of the rights violations of third party potential offerors. 
 To summarize, the essence of free trade as I am defining it is consent: trade 
consists of voluntary mutual bargained-for exchanges of roughly equal value.  I have 
suggested three other types of transaction which, while they may look in some ways like 
free trade, do not in fact meet this definition: theft or predation, which may not be trade at 
all; coercion; and exploitation, which may be trade in some sense but also introduce other 
dynamics of concern for normative and pragmatic reasons.  Participants in any of these 
three will see economic value exchange hands, and society may reap some economic 
benefit, but under conditions involving the absence of either basic consent, or the fullness 
of consent. 
 
III Application to Trade Agreements 
 If trade consists of voluntary bargained-for exchanges, then the rules governing 
trade must preserve the possibility of bargained-for exchanges among private parties, and 
must themselves be the fruit of such a bargain.  If the rules of the game are not 
themselves mutually agreed-to, then any bargains struck under those rules will also not be 
fully free, as they are not fully agreed-to.  This means there is an essential role for 
consent in making trade agreements that are about free trade, or “trade” at all.  Without 
consent, agreements structuring economic exchange will be a form of oppression or, 
worse, predation.   
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 This consent must go beyond mere recognition of the formal sovereign 
independence of states, the formal legitimacy of governments, and the formalities of 
ratification.  It must extend to difficult questions such as whether the states have anything 
resembling equal bargaining power; whether a negotiating government speaks for the full 
range of affected citizens, or whether it speaks for its people at all; and whether it has an 
adequate alternative to a negotiated outcome.24 Otherwise, we risk mistaking a mere form 
of consent for actual consent.25  
 In this essay, I am focusing on the structural level of analysis, inquiring to what 
extent trade agreements preserve or undercut consent, and hence are or are not truly or 
fully agreements about “trade.”  In order to do so and to illustrate how this model works, 
I will examine some key aspects of CAFTA,26 a recent trade agreement between the 
United States and six Central American states, for evidence of inequality in power 
between parties, and how that inequality was used to vitiate or weaken consent.  In other 
words, I am looking for examples of what is ostensibly free trade but in fact may be a 
form of coercion (no free bargaining), exploitation (no equivalent value) or extraction (no 
consent).  
  A Review of Trade Agreements: CAFTA 
 If we are looking for aspects of trade agreements that preserve or jeopardize 
consent, or reveal the degree of consent that went into their formation, there are two basic 
                                                 
24 In negotiation theory, the latter is referred to as a party’s BATNA, or best alternative to a negotiated 
agreement.  If a party has no BATNA, it is in a very weak position.  ROGER FISHER AND WILLIAM URY, 
GETTING TO YES 104 (PENGUIN 1981) (BATNA “is the only standard which can protect you both from 
accepting terms that are too unfavorable and from rejecting terms it would be in your interest to accept.").  
25 Similarly, Weil writes that in looking purely at the fact of voting, democratic theory mistakes true 
consent for a form of consent, which can easily, like any other form, be mere form.  Justice and Human 
Society, supra note 17 at 126. 
26 Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement, Aug. 5, 2004, 
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/CAFTA/CAFTA-DR_Final_Texts/Section_Index.html 
[hereinafter CAFTA]. 
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areas to examine.  First, we must look at the nature of the negotiations.  There are at least 
two issues here: the problem of unequal bargaining power between states, and the 
question of legitimacy stemming from the problem of under-represented groups.  Second, 
we must look at the terms of the agreement, what was substantively agreed between the 
parties.  Key substantive areas to examine include the treaty’s dispute resolution 
mechanism, the structure and timing of market access, the extent and nature of domestic 
law reform mandated by the treaty, and what provision there is, if any, for special & 
differential treatment.  The negotiation and substantive aspects of the inquiry are 
interrelated; for example, the more unequal the bargaining power, the more we would 
expect the substance to be one-sided as well.   
  1 Nature of the Negotiations  
   a. Theft and Lack of Representation 
 We cannot assume even in the U.S., let alone most developing countries, that the 
government speaks for all affected sectors of society.  This issue is of special concern 
throughout the Central American region, where governments have a history of capture by 
elites.27  
 Lack of representation is particularly serious when fundamental economic 
decisions are being made, as in the CAFTA negotiations.  In Nicaragua, for example, 
despite a recent history of social revolution, there was concern on the part of many 
sectors of society that the new government only spoke for and negotiated on behalf of the 
                                                 
27 See THOMAS E. SKIDMORE & PETER H. SMITH, MODERN LATIN AMERICA 46 (6th ed. 2005) (exercise of 
political power by or for elites endemic to region). 
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monied interests.28 There was widespread ignorance among most affected groups of what 
CAFTA would in fact do, and allegations of a campaign of disinformation on the part of 
the government.29   
 These allegations, if true, undercut the legitimacy of the treaty, even as they 
streamline for the U.S. the process of securing concessions sought on behalf of U.S. 
economic interests.  This means the treaty cannot be viewed as expressing the consent of 
many of the affected parties.  In the terms of this essay, the treaty does not create free 
trade for them, but a form of theft or extraction.  For such parties, the treaty and its 
resulting economic activity are neither mutual nor voluntary; they are not trading - 
something is being taken from them. 
   b. Exploitation and Lack of Real Alternatives 
 Even if CAFTA were to prove to be both mutual and voluntary, we must still 
consider if it represents the full consent of the parties.  During the CAFTA negotiations, 
for example, it was often mentioned by the government in Nicaragua that the country did 
not have a real alternative to the treaty, since the US plays such a dominant role in their 
                                                 
28 Ginger Thomson & Steven R. Weisman, U.S. Suspends Military Aid to Nicaragua, N.Y. Times, March 
21, 2005, at A3 (U.S.-backed conservative governments have historically failed to address extreme poverty 
and been widely perceived as corrupt). 
29 Interviews conducted by the author with civic leaders and NGO activists, Managua, Nicaragua, May 
2004.  Lack of genuine social dialogue and political capture on the part of the wealthy elites have also been 
alleged in other CAFTA countries.  See Diputados Aprueban de Urgencia Nacional el TLC (Guatemalan 
Legislators Approve CAFTA on Emergency Basis), PRENSA LIBRE (MARCH 11, 2005), available at 
http://www.prensalibre.com/pl/2005/marzo/11/109623.html.  There have also been suggestions that the 
U.S. has been publicly and privately involved in misrepresentations concerning CAFTA and regional 
politics.  See Nicaragua: Laboring with the Passage of CAFTA, SISTER CITY NEWS (WINTER 2005) 
(alleging U.S.-backed disinformation campaign); President George W. Bush, Address at the signing of 
CAFTA-DR (August 2, 2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/08/20050802-
2.html (at signing Bush implied CAFTA would help, “eliminate the lawlessness and instability that 
terrorists and criminals and drug traffickers feed on.”). 
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economy as the principal source of capital and markets.30 Put in the terms of this essay, 
this raises the possibility that the treaty may be exploitative.   
 The history of external domination in this hemisphere, both colonially and post-
colonially, suggests that other states in the region and elsewhere which might have 
offered more attractive alternative markets and sources of capital, may not have been able 
to do so.  The U.S., for example, exercised its role as regional hegemon during the last 
century to restrict regional and other states’ opportunities in the hemisphere, which has 
continuing economic effects today.31 Put in the framework Hillel Steiner has developed, 
this raises the risk that any trade agreements formed between the U.S. and states in the 
region are exploitative in nature.  More specifically, the risk is that the U.S. will exploit 
the fact that in this trade negotiation “auction,” its bid is the highest bid, either because 
other regional parties have been prevented from developing the ability to effectively bid 
due to the absence of sufficient economic development, or because other external parties 
have not been able to develop ties and levels of commerce and investment to match the 
level of the U.S.  
  2 Substantive Provisions 
 In CAFTA’s substantive provisions, we can see evidence that suggests the same 
dynamics at work, as the inequality in bargaining power and problem of legitimacy 
manifest themselves in treaty terms which reflect impaired consent, and which impair the 
consent of others. 
                                                 
30 Interviews conducted by author with Nicaraguan trade officials, May 2004; see also Central American 
Trade: Five Get Anxious, ECONOMIST, May 29, 2004 at The Americas (explaining that CAFTA makes little 
allowance for power disparities between signatories but is nevertheless seen as necessary to “survive the 
next few years.”);  Christopher Marquis, Latin Allies of the U.S.: Docile and Reliable No Longer., N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 9, 2004, at A (characterizing CAFTA nations “desperate to stay in the club.”).    
31 SKIDMORE & SMITH, supra note 27, at 5 (historic external domination has both threatened sovereignty 
and restricted available policy choices). 
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   a. Coercion, Exploitation and the Terms of Market Access 
 The terms and timing of market access can speak volumes about the weaker 
party’s capacity to protect its markets from premature competition.  Moreover, when we 
look at what sectors are excluded by whom and why, we get a fuller picture of the extent 
to which the weaker party was able to bargain for what it wanted and needed. 
 To take the agriculture sector as an example, CAFTA eliminates the protections in 
place for regional small-scale farmers and agricultural workers in several key sectors 
such as rice and yellow corn,32 exposing them to immediate competition from highly 
subsidized U.S. agricultural products.33 However, the U.S. assiduously maintained 
protection of sugar,34 one of its most sensitive sectors that had been of interest to Central 
American exporters.35 Moreover, in many of the sectors where CAFTA governments 
announced victories, their exports had either already enjoyed privileged access under the 
U.S. trade preference programs, or are effectively blocked by sanitary or phytosanitary  
measures.36
 Such a one-sided bargain offers evidence of the disparity in bargaining power 
which plagues the treaty.37 In order to understand the consent by Central American 
governments to such one-sided provisions, it may be helpful to employ the concepts of 
coercion and exploitation developed here.  That such one-sided market access provisions 
                                                 
32 CAFTA, supra note 26, Annex 3.3.
33 Carlos Galian, CAFTA: The Nail in the Coffin of Central American Agriculture, (Oxfam International 
2004), in WHY WE SAY NO TO CAFTA (Alliance for Responsible Trade 2004). 
34 CAFTA, supra note 26, Annex 3.3, Tariff Schedule of the United States
35 Galian, supra note 33; see Costa Rica to be the Fifth Country in New Trade pact with U.S.  New York 
Times A6 January 26, 2004 (US won its demand for opening Central American agriculture market to its 
exports while maintaining protection for sugar industry, of interest to the region). 
36 Galian, supra note 33, at 6.   
37 Harvesting Poverty: A New Trade Deal, New York Times A30 December 22, 2003 (CAFTA’s terms 
reflect asymmetry in negotiating power between U.S. and region).  Such allegations have also been raised 
about the WTO agreements and the Uruguay Round.  See J. MICHAEL FINGER & JULIO NOGUES, THE 
UNBALANCED URUGUAY ROUND OUTCOME: THE NEW AREAS IN FUTURE WTO NEGOTIATIONS 3-4 (World 
Bank, Pol’y Res. Working Paper Series No. 2732, 2001). 
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were agreed-to by Central American governments may suggest a coercive aspect to the 
negotiation, in which the U.S. relied on its inequality in power to keep certain options 
(such as sugar liberalization) off the table while pressing ahead for the concessions it 
wanted.38 Alternatively or in tandem, Central American consent can be evidence of 
exploitation, insofar as the U.S. was relying on the absence in the “auction” of other 
states able to offer Central America more attractive terms.  In either case, the one-sided 
nature of the market access provisions in agriculture suggest how the treaty may not 
reflect truly free trade. 
 Even those terms that may first appear as U.S. concessions may prove otherwise 
upon further inspection.39  Textiles have been widely trumpeted as one of the premier 
benefits conferred on the Central American nations by CAFTA.40 However, the CAFTA 
textile provisions include safeguard provisions allowing the U.S. to unilaterally impose 
tariffs if there has been a surge of textile imports that may hurt domestic manufacturing.41 
Such safeguard provisions are standard in trade agreements and by themselves do not 
suggest an absence of consent.  However, the U.S. has already used the threat of invoking 
this safeguard in an attempt to renegotiate a term of CAFTA.42 At the behest of the textile 
lobby, the US is currently demanding either the delay of duty-free importation of socks or 
                                                 
38 See U.S. Trade Pact Divides the Central Americans, With Farmers and Others Fearful, New York Times 
August 21, 2005 A18? (2005 Westlaw 13154373) (Central American negotiators lacked sufficient leverage 
to extract needed concessions from U.S., and faced implicit threat of loss of trade preferences).  We will 
not know the full details of the negotiations for some time, as all members of the CAFTA negotiations 
signed confidentiality agreements.  CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES, Transparency and Participation in the 
CAFTA Negotiations, in FAIR TRADE OR FREE TRADE? UNDERSTANDING CAFTA, available at 
http://www.citizen.org/documents/CAFTAbriefingpacket.pdf.    
39 See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
40 Central America Department and Office of the Chief Economist Latin America and Caribbean Region, 
World Bank, DR-CAFTA: Challenges and Opportunities for Central America, 4.     
41 OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, CAFTA POLICY BRIEF MAY 2005 (2005), 
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/CAFTA/Briefing_Book/asset_upload_file583_718
5.pdf. 
42 PENSION BILL INCLUDING TRADE PROVISIONS FACES UNCERTAIN PATH IN SENATE, 
Inside US Trade, August 4, 2006. 
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alternatively the modification of their rule of origin requirements, in order to protect the 
U.S. sock manufacturing industry.43 Given that the CAFTA nations have not been 
receptive to this demand, it appears likely the US will invoke this safeguard as 
retaliation.44
 The manner in which the safeguard provisions have been invoked in this 
renegotiation illustrates aspects of U.S. trade negotiations which jeopardize consent.  In 
this case, under special-interest-based Congressional pressure, the Bush administration 
has invoked a lawful provision in an unlawful manner, as a threat in order to attempt to 
force a change in the terms of a previously negotiated trade agreement.  Such an attempt 
to change a previously negotiated agreement is coercive.  Were this a case in private law, 
such modifications would most likely be held invalid under traditional contracts 
doctrine.45
   b. Coercion and Law Reform 
 If we are investigating consent, we should also take a close look at those aspects 
of trade agreements which mandate law reform, to determine who in fact benefits from 
these reforms.  To take just one example, the CAFTA services chapter requires Costa 
                                                 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Assuming that traditional contracts doctrine is a proxy for domestic notions of fairness, application of the 
Restatement is a useful exercise to measure how fair U.S. negotiation practice is by its own standards.  The 
Restatement Second of Contracts states that “[a] promise modifying a duty under a contract not fully 
performed on either side is binding if the modification is fair and equitable in view of the circumstances not 
anticipated by the parties when the contract was made.”  In this case, a modification made under threat is 
hardly fair, and the circumstances invoked - that CAFTA would lead to an influx of imported socks – 
hardly unanticipated (indeed, that is the purpose of a safeguards clause in the first place).  Therefore any 
modification to CAFTA made on this premise is invalid and would not be sustained in court.  Although this 
example does not directly map onto the case of an international treaty, it illustrates how U.S. trade policy is 
not always consistent with notions of justice inherent in domestic private law.  Stated differently, the rules 
at home are not the same as the rules abroad.     
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Rica to undertake significant substantive revisions of its agency and distribution law.46 
These revisions can be seen as an end-run around the protections which such laws 
typically include for agents and distributors in the event of termination, to the benefit of 
foreign (here U.S.) principals.   
The treaty requires Costa Rica to enact new laws which will not presume that 
such commercial relationships are exclusive,47 and which mandate that termination with 
notice but absent any breach of obligation is nevertheless to be considered termination for 
just cause, thus waiving all rights of the agent or distributor to indemnification.48 Finally, 
all such contracts will now be deemed subject to private arbitration unless expressly 
subject to litigation.49   
 Although Costa Rican law may in some respects have been more protective than 
other developing country agency laws,50 these changes go beyond simply conforming 
Costa Rican law to modern standards.  These changes soften provisions found 
particularly onerous from the perspective of U.S. firms, such as restrictions on their 
freedom to terminate agreements without cost, and limit important rights previously 
enjoyed by Costa Rican citizens, such as the right to access the courts.  This imposition of 
arbitration is particularly noteworthy for two reasons: first, given that the U.S. already 
                                                 
46 CAFTA, supra note 26, Annex 11.13, Schedule of Costa Rica, ¶¶ 1–6, mandating changes to Costa 
Rica’s Law No. 6209, “Law for the Protection of the Representative of Foreign Companies.”  
47 Under Law No. 6209, such contracts were impliedly exclusive.  U.S. COMMERCIAL SERVICE, U.S 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, DOING BUSINESS IN COSTA RICA: A COUNTRY COMMERCIAL GUIDE FOR U.S. 
COMPANIES 2006, 10 (2006). 
48 Under the old law, Costa Rican representatives had been broadly protected against termination, subject 
only to narrow grounds for “just cause.”  David R. Martinez, At Termination, Independent Sales Reps are 
Anything But, 5/31/1999 LATIN AM. L. & BUS. REP. 
49 Under Law No. 6209, access to Costa Rican courts could not be waived by contract, even with explicit 
arbitration clauses.  Id. 
50 Interview by the author with Professor F.E. Guerra-Pujol; see also Salli A. Swartz, International Sales 
Transactions: Agency, Distribution and Franchise Agreements, in SECTION OF INT’L LAW AND PRACTICE 
AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, NEGOTIATING AND STRUCTURING INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 
10, 17 (MARK R. SANDSTROM & DAVID N. GOLDSWEIG EDS. 2ND ED. 2003). 
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played an influential role in the 1997 overhaul of Costa Rica’s arbitration system;51 and, 
second, given that under U.S. domestic law, the imposition of arbitration in contracts of 
adhesion is one ground for their unenforceability.52 In other words, one of the places 
where private firms exercise their unequal bargaining power over consumers is by 
imposing arbitration instead of litigation.   
 When viewed in this light, the fact that the Costa Rican government would agree 
to strip protections from agents and distributors and to impose U.S. – style arbitration on 
a class of private parties through treaty law, may be evidence of coercion at the state 
level, which creates a coercive effect on private parties as well.  CAFTA might be 
considered, in this sense, an adhesion treaty.  Here CAFTA fails both aspects of free 
trade: it does not preserve the bargained-for exchanges among private parties, and it is 
not itself in this instance a voluntary bargained-for exchange among states. 
   c. Coercion and Dispute Resolution 
 Another revealing aspect of trade agreements is the manner in which their dispute 
resolution provisions are structured.  Informal nonbinding consultations, while apparently 
neutral, favor the more powerful party.  Thus while the WTO’s binding dispute 
settlement process has been key to several victories by developing countries, in NAFTA 
                                                 
51 Elizabeth Thomas, Commercial Arbitration in Costa Rica (unpublished paper on file with author).  
Thomas’ analysis documents the U.S. role in reforming Costa Rican arbitration law to its own way of 
thinking, arguably giving U.S. parties an advantage. 
52 Although the Federal Arbitration Act favors the enforcement of arbitration agreements, they are still 
subject to challenges under state law principles of unconscionability.  Generally, to be unenforceable a 
contract of adhesion must be both substantively and procedurally unconscionable.  Given that under 
CAFTA arbitration may be implied by law, those agreements are arguably already procedurally 
unconscionable.  Thus, if these were U.S. contracts, absent the unique imprimatur of federal law, their 
enforceability would depend solely on the ability of their substantive terms to withstand strict scrutiny.  See 
generally Thomas H. Oehmke & Joan M. Brovins, The Arbitration Contract—Making it and Breaking it, 
83 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 1.   
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and CAFTA the dispute resolution provisions allow disparities in economic power to 
influence outcomes.   
 The CAFTA dispute settlement provisions look quite formal and legal.  However, 
when the implementation provisions are examined closely, it is clear that they carry 
forward the NAFTA-style preference on the part of the US for nonbinding dispute 
resolution.53  In other words, the arbitral panel’s final report is not implemented as a legal 
decision; rather, it is the basis for a settlement by the parties, which need not track or 
implement the panel report at all.54 Moreover, should the prevailing party refuse to accept 
a settlement short of full implementation, its only recourse is suspension of equivalent 
benefits.  However, it is well-document in the literature that such suspensions are 
particularly inadequate in agreements between states with great economic disparities, 
because the markets of small economies are simply too small for such measures to create 
any real economic incentive on the part of a country like the US to change its policies.55  
In other words, all CAFTA disputes involving the U.S. are in the end subject to the 
wishes of the most powerful party, the U.S. 
 
IV. Implications and Applications 
 A. Role of Trade Law and Institutions in Safeguarding Consent 
 If trade agreements do not facilitate consensual economic exchanges, and are not 
themselves the result of consensual negotiations, they become oppressive.  One way to 
                                                 
53 See generally Frank J. Garcia, Decision-making and Dispute Resolution in the FTAA: An Essay in Trade 
Governance, 18 MICH. J. INTL. L. 357, 378-83 (1997) (analyzing NAFTA dispute resolution mechanism). 
54 CAFTA, supra note 26, Article 20.15.  It is true that the parties can elect to pursue a claim in the WTO 
instead where they have overlapping rights, but this is of no help where the rights are unique to CAFTA, 
and in any event does not alter the essentially nonbinding nature of CAFTA dispute settlement per se. 
55 See Gregory Shaffer, The Challenges of WTO Law: Strategies for Developing Country Adaptation, 5 
WORLD TRADE REV. 177 (2006) (surveying challenges to developing countries). 
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envision the role of trade institutions is as that of playground monitor, charged with 
maintaining a beneficial process of interaction, but allowing a great deal of latitude to the 
participants in establishing their own relationships, and conducting their own 
transactions.  As with playground games, there will be transitory winners and losers, but 
the monitor’s role is to watch out for bullying.  In CAFTA, there is no playground 
monitor – the agreement principally reflects the interests of the more powerful party, the 
U.S., and leaves the U.S. relatively free to achieve its goals once the agreement itself is 
implemented.56  In this way, CAFTA represents a failure on the part of trade law to 
perform one of its key social functions. 
 We should also be concerned when trade relations take on the properties of a 
monopoly, because of its stifling and possibly oppressive nature.  Returning to the 
playground metaphor, one expects to see some turnover as to who plays which role, who 
is winning and losing – it is rare for the same child to always win, and if this happens, the 
rules or the teams are usually changed to return the game to the realm of healthy 
competition, or else the other children lose interest and the game stops.   
 The CAFTA treaty sets up a system which resembles the sort of playground in 
which the same child wins most of the time, and is perceived as continuously trying to 
formulate self-serving rules, with little effective restraint and with the leverage to force 
everyone else to play along – the other children cannot afford to stop playing.  At the 
public level, such oppressive systems are usually maintained at significant cost to private 
citizens through bureaucracies and enforcement mechanisms, a higher cost than if the 
                                                 
56 This is consistent with a larger pattern of hegemonic trade agreements discernable in U.S. regional trade 
policy, which one scholar has analogized to the “Imperial preference” trade agreements employed by 
colonial powers.  Sydney M. Cone III, The Promotion of FTAs Viewed in Terms of MFN Treatment and 
‘Imperial Preference,’ 26 MICH. J. INTL. L. 563 (2005). 
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system could count on willing participants.  From a trade perspective, this also doesn’t 
necessarily allow for the emergence of the best products and services.57   
 B. Liberalism and Trade Agreements 
 States which seek legitimacy must take care that their foreign policy does not 
violate their own founding principles.58 Liberal states risk compromising their basic 
commitment to freedom when they fashion or accept trade agreements which vitiate the 
consent of the states or peoples they involve.   
 Simone Weil writes that justice has as its object the exercise of the faculty of 
consent in human relations.  If trade agreements do not establish a framework for 
consensual transactions and are not themselves the fruit of fully consensual negotiations, 
they are no longer just as liberal states would understand that term.59 Instead, in 
concluding such trade agreements, liberal states risk gratifying what Weil terms that 
“shameful, unacknowledged taste for conquests which enslave under the pretense of 
liberating.”60 For liberal states, trade agreements lose their moral justification when not 
free. 
 C. Trade and Security 
 Finally, trade agreements which are not consensual create conditions for 
blowback.61 Perceptions of injustice are strong motivators, leading to civil conflict, 
                                                 
57 See supra note 19. 
58 On the link between a state’s foreign conduct and its own political legitimacy, see LEA BRILMAYER, 
JUSTIFYING INTERNATIONAL ACTS (1989). 
59 Weil’s approach finds contemporary echoes in Sen’s re-conceptualization of justice as freedom, more 
specifically in his focus on the actual extent of individuals’ freedom of choice, as essential to the realization 
of any scheme of liberal distributive justice.  INEQUALITY RE-EXAMINED 31-8 (1992). 
60 Justice and Human Society, supra note 17 at 126. 
61 Defined as unintended adverse policy consequences.  See CHALMERS JOHNSON, BLOWBACK: THE COSTS 
AND CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICAN EMPIRE (2004). 
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instability and violent counter-reaction.62 One current manifestation of blowback for the 
U.S. is the resurgence of leftist authoritarian populism in Latin America.  To many in the 
region, the unequal terms and social unrest caused by agreements such as CAFTA 
represent failures of democracy.  Hence, for example, the rhetoric and appeal of 
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, his Bolivarian Revolution and his increasing 
influence in the region.63   
 The U.S. has currently avowed a policy of security through the spread of 
democracy.  It may find that it is undermining this goal by infringing on consent and 
perpetuating inherent injustices in its current hemispheric trade policy.64  Eschewing 
opportunities for coercive or exploitative trade agreements might allow the region’s 
people to finally enjoy the gains of trade while simultaneously weakening the 
attractiveness of leftist authoritarianism.  Thus there is a mutually reinforcing relationship 
between consensual economic relations and our own security. 
   
V. Conclusion 
 In order for trade to be truly free and fully trade, it must be mutual, consensual, 
bargained-for, and involve the exchange of equivalent value.  Free trade must be 
consensual, in the sense that all parties are free to enter into the transactions, and perhaps 
even more importantly, that all parties have had a meaningful role in formulating the 
rules of play.  If economic exchange is not consensual in both senses, it is not trade, but 
                                                 
62 See Frank J. Garcia, Trade, Justice and Security, in TRADE AS GUARANTOR OF PEACE, LIBERTY AND 
SECURITY? CRITICAL, HISTORICAL AND EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES 78 (Padideh Ala’i et al. eds., 2006). 
63 The Return o f Populism, ECONOMIST, April 15, 2006, at Latin America.  I am indebted to Dan Blanchard 
for drawing this point to my attention.  See also Stephen O’Neal, Hugo Chavez and the Bolivarian 
Alternative for the Americas (unpublished paper on file with author) (alternatives to neoliberal trade 
agreements a cornerstone of Venezuelan foreign policy). 
64 See Cone, supra note 56 at 583-4 (imperial-style trade agreements create political ill will against 
hegemonic power).  
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some form of extraction.  If it is not fully consensual, it involves some form of 
oppression, such as coercion or exploitation.   
 An examination of CAFTA suggests that the pattern of trade in this hemisphere is 
not truly free trade.  Even a preliminary examination of CAFTA’s substantive provisions 
and negotiation history reveals elements of coercion, exploitation and predation.  Should 
this continue as the pattern for U.S.-driven hemispheric integration, this does not bode 
well for regional development, our political ideals and our own security. 
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